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Collaborating to Nowhere:
The Imperative of Government
Accountability for Restoring
the Chesapeake Bay
Rena Steinzor and Shana Jones*

N

o multi-billion dollar initiative better illustrates
the pitfalls of “collaborative partnerships”1 than
the Chesapeake Bay Program (“CBP” or “Bay Program”), a three-decade long effort that has achieved limited success in restoring highly degraded water quality in
the world’s second largest estuary.2 This uneasy alliance of
six Bay states3 and the federal Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) has cost approximately four billion dollars,
primarily in federal funds, but has, at best, achieved stasis
in a watershed plagued by excessive nutrient loading and
expanding dead zones.4 Given the large increases in popu* Rena Steinzor is a professor at the University of Maryland Carey
School of Law and the president of the Center for Progressive Reform, a
network of legal scholars specializing in the protection of public health,
worker and consumer safety, and the environment. She has worked on
Chesapeake Bay issues for two decades. Shana Jones was the executive
director of CPR and its senior policy analyst regarding the Chesapeake
Bay; she teaches environmental law in a clinical setting at William and
Mary Law School.
The CBP describes itself as a “collaborative multi-state and federal partnership.” Robert Koroncai et al., Setting and Allocating the Chesapeake
Bay Basin Nutrient and Sediment Loads: The Collaborative Process,
Technical Tools and Innovative Approaches 1 (2003), available at http://
www.chesapeakebay.net/content/publications/cbp_19713.pdf (“The 1983
Chesapeake Bay Agreement set the stage for the collaborative multi-state and
federal partnership.”).
2.	 Rena Steinzor & Shana Jones, Reauthorizing the Chesapeake Bay Program:
Exchanging Promises for Results 1 (Ctr. for Progressive Reform, White Paper
No. 903, June 2009), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/
chesbayfinal.pdf; see also Chesapeake Bay, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://
omp.gso.uri.edu/ompweb/doee/science/descript/bayches.htm (describing the
geography and geology of the Chesapeake Bay watershed) (last visited Dec. 16,
2012).
3.	 The Bay states include Delaware, the District of Columbia, Maryland, New
York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, although Maryland, Pennsylvania, and
Virginia are by far the dominant partners. See The Chesapeake Bay Watershed,
Chesapeake Bay Program, http://www.chesapeakebay.net/discover/baywatershed (last visited Dec. 16, 2012).
4.	 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-08-1131R, Recent Actions
by the Chesapeake Bay Program Are Positive Steps Toward More Effectively Guiding the Restoration Effort, but Additional Steps Are
Needed 13 (2008) [hereinafter GAO, Recent Actions] (reporting $3.7 billion in direct funding from 1995 to 2004, as well as $1.9 billion in additional
indirect funding).

lation and development that characterize the region, water
quality could have gotten even worse.5 Even so, substantial
improvement is what the partners promised and unquestionably did not achieve.6
The CBP has twice missed ambitious, but self-imposed
goals to (1) reduce nutrient loading in the Bay by forty percent no later than the year 20007 and (2) remove the Bay
from EPA’s national list of waters impaired to the point that
they can no longer support their designated uses (e.g., drinking, swimming, fishing, or boating).8 These failures may have
embarrassed political leaders for a news cycle or two, but not
to the point that they seriously considered overhauling their
partnership in the CBP.9 Only when a blistering report by
the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) motivated
actual cuts in CBP funding did the states in the partnership
confront EPA’s determination to hold them accountable for
reducing pollution.10
Slowly but surely, though, reform and revitalization are
becoming manifest. In May 2009, President Obama issued
Executive Order 13,508 on Chesapeake Bay Protection and

1.	
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5.	
6.	
7.	

Steinzor & Jones, Reauthorizing the Chesapeake Bay Program, supra note 2, at 1.
Id.
See Cynthia J. Aukerman, Agricultural Diffuse Pollution Controls: Lessons for
Scotland From the Chesapeake Bay Watershed, 20 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 191,
247 (2004) (describing the revision of the forty percent goal); see also Karl
Blankenship, Review Warns 40% Goal Won’t Be Enough, Chesapeake Bay J.,
Dec. 1997, available at http://www.bayjournal.com/article/review_warns_40_
goal_will_not_be_enough (“After a yearlong review, the Bay Program has concluded that its decade-old goal of reducing the amount of nutrients entering
the Chesapeake 40 percent by the year 2000 won’t happen unless control efforts are accelerated.”).
8.	 See Chesapeake Bay Found., Restoring Clean Water and the Chesapeake Bay 17 (2008), available at www.cbf.org/document.doc?id=53 (“It is
now clear that, although the partners have made significant commitments, we
will finish 2010 far from the achievement of the necessary pollution reduction
goals.”). The requirements for the impaired waters list are in section 303(d) of
the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2006).
9.	 See Steinzor & Jones, Reauthorizing the Chesapeake Bay Program, supra note 2,
at 4.
10. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-06-96, Chesapeake Bay Program: Improved Strategies Are Needed to Better Assess, Report, and
Manage Restoration Progress 5 (2005) [hereinafter GAO 2005 Report],
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0696.pdf.
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Restoration,11 declaring the Bay a national treasure and signaling that EPA will play a strong role in leading Bay restoration.12 The order marked a dramatic departure from
EPA’s traditional, hands-off posture, offering the promise of
real federal leadership on Bay restoration.13 It required EPA
to “examine how to make full use of its authorities under
the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) to protect and restore the
Chesapeake Bay and its tributary waters” and to establish
an “independent evaluator” to “strengthen accountability”
and report periodically on progress made toward meeting
Bay-wide goals.14
In 2011, EPA announced a mandatory Total Maximum
Daily Load (“TMDL”) for the Bay.15 This “pollution
diet” includes ninety-two different limits for impaired
water quality segments.16 If it stays the course of compelling the states to fulfill their commitments to write permits that reduce pollutant loading to the limits set in the
TMDL, water quality in the Bay should improve steadily.
Yet, EPA has encountered gale-force political resistance
by congressional opponents of regulation and recalcitrant state and local politicians.17 Its ability to combat
the same dynamics that sabotaged past restoration efforts
is not yet clear.18
For example, despite the Executive Order’s call for the creation of an independent evaluator for the Bay Program, the
Bay states demurred.19 Instead of establishing a permanent
and independent entity that would verify the implementation of federal and state programs on the ground, they opted
for one-time funding to have the National Research Council
(“NRC”) of the National Academy of Sciences conduct yet
another analysis of environmental conditions in the Bay and

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

16.
17.
18.
19.

Exec. Order No. 13,508, 74 Fed. Reg. 23099, 23099 (May 15, 2009).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 206, 74 Fed. Reg. at 23101.
Clean Water Act § 303(d): Notice for the Establishment of the Total Maximum Daily Load (“TMDL”) for the Chesapeake Bay, 76 Fed. Reg. 549,
549–50 (Jan. 5, 2011). Controlling traditional “point sources” of pollution
by requiring them to meet technology-based permit requirements is only the
first step under the Clean Water Act’s regulatory scheme. CWA §§ 301–09,
33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-19 (2006). Under section 303(d) of the CWA, if point
source controls are implemented but water quality standards nevertheless remain unmet, states must take a second step: they must define the total amount
of specific pollution a waterbody can take (the TMDL) and then distribute the
pollution loadings among point source dischargers and nonpoint and natural
sources. CWA § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2006). States must then work to
meet the new TMDL limits, which usually requires point sources to face more
stringent permit requirements and raises the possibility for increased state
regulation of nonpoint sources. Id.; see also Oliver A. Houck, The Clean
Water Act TMDL Program: Law, Policy, and Implementation 140 (2d
ed. 2002) (describing the policy history of EPA’s efforts to fulfill its obligations
to implement the TMDL provisions of the CWA).
Clean Water Act § 303(d), 76 Fed. Reg. at 549.
Doug Siglin, Change You Must Believe In, Chesapeake Bay Action Plan (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.bayactionplan.com/2012/01/
change-you-must-believe-in/.
Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 559 F.3d 512, 536–39
(D.C. Cir. 2009).
Chesapeake Bay Program, Independent Evaluator: Key Challenges 14 (Nov.
1, 2011) (unpublished draft report), available at http://archive.chesapeakebay.
net/pubs/calendar/34450_11-01-11_Report_1_11574.pdf; see also Steinzor &
Jones, Reauthorizing the Chesapeake Bay Program, supra note 2, at 3 (urging
adoption of an Independent Evaluator function for the first time).
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the CBP’s past shortcomings.20 Among other findings, the
NRC committee admitted that it “was unable to determine
the reliability and accuracy of the [restoration] data reported
by Bay jurisdictions,” and recommended that “independent
(third-party) auditing of the tracking and accounting at state
and local levels would be necessary to ensure the reliability
and accuracy of the data reported.”21 As this Article goes to
press, CBP officials have arrived once again at a crossroads,
wavering between evaluating themselves by setting up internal “action teams” and establishing the truly independent
evaluator called for in the Executive Order and recommended by the NRC.22
An independent entity to monitor the performance of
the CBP and to hold EPA and the states accountable for
their efforts to reduce nutrient loading in the Bay is sorely
needed. Despite their public posture of collaboration, states
participate in the CBP primarily to protect their own interests and prevent the group from agreeing to restoration or
pollution prevention programs that would cost too much
money or anger crucial constituent groups.23 Rather than
take the Bay states at their word that promised programs are
adequately funded and—even more important—are being
implemented effectively, we urge the CBP to create an entity
with the mission of ground-truthing such claims.24 The independent evaluator must have adequate resources not only to
conduct paper and interview-based audits, but also to spotcheck state compliance by actually visiting the places where
states claim that cover crops to prevent runoff were planted
or tertiary sewage treatment was installed.25 This entity
20. Chartered by Congress in 1863, the National Academy of Sciences (“NAS”) is
a private and nonprofit society of distinguished scholars who advise the federal
government on scientific and technical matters. Who We Are, Nat’l Acad. of
Scis., http://www.nationalacademies.org/about/whoweare/index.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2012). Organized by the NAS in 1916, the National Research
Council (“NRC”) is the operating agency for NAS, consisting of a staff that
enlists, organizes, and supports experts from around the nation—who are unpaid for their service on NAS study committees—to issue studies and reports
upon request. Nat’l Academies, Working With the National Academies:
A Guide for Prospective Study Sponsors (n.d.), available at http://dels.nas.
edu/resources/static-assets/exec-office-other/sponsor_brochure.pdf. In 2009,
EPA requested the NRC to “evaluate and provide advice on the CBP nutrient
reduction program and strategy, [specifically directing] the NRC to evaluate the
tracking of best management practice implementation, tracking and accounting efforts, the two-year milestone strategy, and the states’ and federal agencies’
adaptive management strategies, and to suggest improvements to these strategies that might better attain the CBP goals.” Nat’l Research Council, Nat’l
Acad. of Scis., Achieving Nutrient and Sediment Reduction Goals in
the Chesapeake Bay: An Evaluation of Program Strategies and Implementation viii (2011) [hereinafter NAS/NRC Committee Report], available
at www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13131.
21. NAS/NRC Committee Report, supra note 20, at 4.
22. Chesapeake Bay Program, Independent Evaluator, supra note 19, at 12; Minutes from Chesapeake Bay Program Principals’ Staff Comm. Meeting (Feb.
16, 2012), available at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/channel_files/17880/
(attachment_i.a)_psc_actions_and_decisions_2-16-12_revised_4-19-12.docx.
23. As part of our work for the Center for Progressive Reform, we were among the
first to advocate for the independent evaluator function as a crucial element of
EPA’s then nascent effort to enforce the Bay-wide TMDL. See, e.g., Steinzor &
Jones, Reauthorizing the Chesapeake Bay Program, supra note 2, at 3 (urging the
implementation of an independent audit function for the first time).
24. Id.
25. Memorandum from Shana Jones, Senior Policy Analyst, Ctr. for Progressive
Reform, & Rena Steinzor, Pres., Ctr. for Progressive Reform, to the Principals’
Staff Comm. 1–9 (Sept. 3, 2008), available at http://www.progressivereform.
org/articles/Bay_Accountability_Office_Options_Memo.pdf.
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COLLABORATING TO NOWHERE

should consist of a senior person of impeccable integrity and
a small staff.26 To ensure its independence, the office should
also report directly to the CBP Executive Council.27
This Article opens with an analysis of why the CBP will
repeat its past failures unless a reliable mechanism for ensuring accountability is created. It then explains how the independent evaluator should be constructed to make possible
the overall success of Bay restoration. Finally, it closes with
a rebuttal of the arguments in favor of self-auditing and
against independent review.

I.

Why Collaboration as Usual Means
Collaborating to Nowhere

The Chesapeake Bay is a poster child both for the wicked
problem of multi-jurisdictional pollution28 and for our
nation’s historic failure of political will to regulate agriculture and tackle land use.29 Most of the Chesapeake Bay and
its tidal waters are listed as impaired under the CWA because
of excess nitrogen, phosphorus, and sediment pollution,30
also known as nutrient pollution.31 Nutrients “cause algae
blooms that consume oxygen and create ‘dead zones’” in
the Bay that choke fish and shellfish and destroy underwater
grasses and aquatic life.32 Agriculture is the largest source of
nutrient pollution in the Bay, followed by runoff from urban
and suburban development.33 Agricultural runoff controls
are inconsistent across the watershed, unfortunately, as it is
largely exempted under the CWA.34
The CBP incontestably faces a daunting task: it must
restore the second largest estuary35 in the world despite the
fact that almost half of the pollution plaguing the Bay is generated by unregulated, nonpoint sources located in multiple
jurisdictions.36 The CBP has unquestionably failed to accomplish the maximum pollution reductions achievable under
its existing legal authority, however, and it has never been
forthcoming about the increasingly urgent need to draw
agriculture within the scope of the CWA’s jurisdiction. The
following discussion will analyze why the CBP has failed to
make significant progress, explaining how the partnership’s
failures reveal the dysfunction that inevitably arises when an
institution’s design—in this case, a “collaborative partner26. Id.
27. Id.
28. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Chesapeake Bay TMDL Executive Summary
ES-7 (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/reg3wapd/pdf/pdf_chesbay/
FinalBayTMDL/BayTMDLExecutiveSummaryFINAL122910_final.pdf.
29. Jeffrey M. Gaba, New Sources, New Growth, and the Clean Water Act, 55 Ala.
L. Rev. 651, 652 & n.12, 662 (2004).
30. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Chesapeake Bay TMDL, supra note 28, at ES-3.
31. Nutrients, Chesapeake Bay Program, http://www.chesapeakebay.net/issues/
issue/nutrients#inline (last visited Dec. 16, 2012).
32. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Chesapeake Bay TMDL, supra note 28, at ES-3.
33. Id.
34. CWA § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2006) (exempting agricultural stormwater from definition of “point source”); see also Pew Env’t Grp., Big Chicken: Pollution and Industrial Poultry Production in America 17–18
(2011) [hereinafter Big Chicken], available at www.pewenvironment.org/
uploadedFiles/PEG/Publications/Report/PEG_BigChicken_July2011.pdf;
Gaba, supra note 29, at 652, 662.
35. Chesapeake Bay, supra note 2.
36. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Chesapeake Bay TMDL, supra note 28, at ES-7.
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ship” with voluntary, non-binding goals—cannot cope with
the jurisdictional, environmental, and stakeholder dynamics
that necessitated action in the first place.37
One threshold reason for the CBP’s shortcomings is
almost painfully obvious, although no one engaged in “collaborating to nowhere” dares to state it clearly in public: the
states vary widely in their commitments to Bay restoration
or, to use a common colloquialism, the level of “skin in the
game” they each have chosen to muster. One of the three
most important players in the CBP—Pennsylvania—has
far less incentive to participate affirmatively in a voluntary
restoration effort than the two other key players, Maryland
and Virginia.38 Equally troubling, although Maryland and
Virginia bemoan Pennsylvania’s inaction, they also find
Pennsylvania a convenient scapegoat and plausible cover for
their own lack of progress, delaying the hard choices they
must also make if the Bay is to be restored.39 As we describe
in more detail below, the symptoms of this mismatch
include diminished accountability, an increasingly opaque
and complicated bureaucracy, a penchant for “lowest common denominator solutions,” and a lack of focus on coming
clean about whether the states and EPA are doing enough
to achieve measurable results.40 Unless reversed, the implication of these dynamics is no less than the slow but inexorable
death of the Chesapeake Bay’s ecology.

A.

Causation: Different Jurisdictions, Different Stakes,
and Unregulated Agriculture

Anyone who negotiates for a living learns a threshold lesson very quickly: unless the parties share an approximately
equal stake in resolving their problems voluntarily, talks are
unlikely to prove productive. Of course, the parties’ ineptitude can scuttle settlement even when it is clearly in everyone’s interests. The most gifted negotiators in the world
cannot achieve resolution when at least one party is convinced
that his alternative to agreement is preferable. As this Article
will show, this basic fact underlies why the CBP’s cooperative partnership has repeatedly missed its own deadlines for
37. See infra Part I.A.
38. See infra Part I.A; Ocean Studies Bd. & Water Sci. & Tech. Bd., Nat’l Research Council, Clean Coastal Waters: Understanding and Reducing
the Effects of Nutrient Pollution 2 (2000), available at http://www.nap.
edu/openbook.php?isbn=0309069483 (explaining that while nutrient pollution harms the Susquehanna’s water quality, it causes less damage as it passes
through the fast-moving and deep river than when it reaches the Bay’s warm,
shallow, and slow-moving estuary); Maps, Chesapeake Bay Program, http://
www.chesapeakebay.net/maps (last visited Dec. 16, 2012) (showing that the
Chesapeake Bay is bordered by the states of Maryland and Virginia but is only
connected to Pennsylvania by means of the Susquehanna River).
39. Darryl Fears, Alarming “Dead Zone’”Grows in the Chesapeake, Wash. Post
(July 24, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/
alarming-dead-zone-grows-in-thechesapeake/%202011/07/20/gIQABRmKXI_story.html (“Especially heavy flows of tainted water from the Susquehanna River brought as much nutrient pollution into the bay by May as normally comes in an entire average year, a Maryland Department of Natural
Resources researcher said.”).
40. See Rena Steinzor & Shana Jones, An Accountability Mechanism for the Chesapeake Bay: Interview Findings 2–3, 5–7 (Ctr. for Progressive Reform, White
Paper No. 808, 2008), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/
Chesapeake_Bay_808.pdf.
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water quality improvement.41 The states participating in the
program simply do not have anything close to an equal stake
in Bay restoration because of how the jurisdictional lines fall
and how nutrient pollution works.42
The geography of the CPB’s three most important players—Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania—means that
each state has remarkably different incentives to participate
in restoration.43 The Chesapeake Bay is bordered by the states
of Maryland and Virginia, but is only connected to Pennsylvania by means of the Susquehanna River.44 The Susquehanna River, which drains into the Bay at Conowingo,
Maryland, is located almost entirely in the state of Pennsylvania, although its headwaters are in New York.45 It provides
fifty percent of the Bay’s freshwater because the Bay is the
“ria” of the Susquehanna—in essence, a drowned river valley
that formed into an estuary.46
Unfortunately, the Susquehanna is not only the Bay’s
most important freshwater source, but due to agricultural
pollution, it is also the leading contributor to the Bay’s
demise.47 The river delivers almost half of the nitrogen pollution loads to the Bay (forty-four percent).48 In contrast,
Virginia and Maryland, combined, deliver roughly the same
amount, at twenty-seven percent and twenty percent respectively.49 The largest dead zone in Bay history, covering onethird of the watershed during the summer and fall of 2011,
was blamed on nutrient run-off from Pennsylvania’s Susquehanna River.50
Taking a geographic, economic, and perhaps even environmental point of view, Pennsylvania’s regressive behavior
in the absence of strong federal leadership becomes more
understandable.51 Although nutrient pollution certainly
harms the Susquehanna’s water quality, it causes less damage as it passes through the fast-moving and deep river than
when it reaches the Bay’s warm, shallow, and slow-moving
estuary.52 Dead zones do not plague the Susquehanna like
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

49.

50.

51.
52.

See supra notes 1–10.
See supra notes 37–38.
See supra note 38.
See Maps, supra note 38.
The Susquehanna River, Susquehanna River Valley Visitors Bureau, http://
www.visitcentralpa.org/page.asp?tid=135&name=The-Susquehanna-River (last visited Dec. 16, 2012).
Captain John Smith Chesapeake National Historic Trail: The Chesapeake Formation, U.S. Nat’l Park Serv., http://www.smithtrail.net/the-chesapeake/formation/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2012).
See supra notes 25–27.
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Sources of Nitrogen, Phosphorus and Sediment to the Chesapeake Bay 4-2 (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/
reg3wapd/pdf/pdf_chesbay/FinalBayTMDL/CBayFinalTMDLSection4
_final.pdf.
Id. at 4-1. At forty-three percent, Virginia dominates phosphorus loads to the
Bay. Id. 4-2. Pennsylvania and Maryland follow at twenty-four percent and
twenty percent, respectively. Id. Sediment loading estimates are similar, with
Virginia at forty-one percent, Pennsylvania at thirty-two percent, and Maryland at seventeen percent. Id.
Fears, supra note 39 (“Especially heavy flows of tainted water from the Susquehanna River brought as much nutrient pollution into the bay by May as normally comes in an entire average year, a Maryland Department of Natural
Resources researcher said.”).
Pollution quickly moved by one state’s river into another state’s bay does not
end up in the “backyard” of the river state. See Ocean Studies Bd. & Water
Sci. & Tech. Bd., supra note 38, at 2.
Id.
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they plague the Bay.53 Further, Pennsylvania does not have
waterside real estate. The state has no physical or cultural
connection to the Bay, as opposed to the watershed, nor
does it receive any real economic benefit from it. In contrast,
the aesthetic, cultural, and economic values the Bay brings
to Maryland and Virginia are considerable—the seafood
industry alone in these states “contributed $3.39 billion in
sales, $890 million in income, and almost 34,000 jobs to the
local economy.”54
To complicate matters even further, only a little more
than half of the entire state of Pennsylvania falls within the
Bay watershed.55 This kind of problem, as Professor Brad
Karkkainen points out, represents severe inconsistencies in
territorial scale, where environmental pollution does not
track sovereign boundaries.56 Not only does Pennsylvania as
a whole get no real benefit from the threatened resource at
issue—a classic transboundary pollution problem—but only
half of the state sits within the Bay watershed, diluting the
political pressure to take action to “save the Bay” when this
big and, in recent years, economically stressed state must
decide how to spend diminishing government resources.57 In
short, we suspect that Pennsylvania—a state that contributes forty-four percent of the nitrogen, twenty-four percent
of the phosphorus, and thirty-two percent of the sediment
pollution that is choking the Bay—has too little incentive
to cooperate with restoration unless the federal government
compels it to do so.58 State funding patterns reflect these
dynamics. In 2010, for example, Pennsylvania spent $166.7
million, Maryland spent $256.6 million, and Virginia spent
$367 million on Bay restoration.59
The differing stakes that states have in the preservation of
transboundary natural resources is among the most important justifications of federal environmental laws and their
enforcement by EPA.60 Despite these challenging realities,
including the pathways of nutrient pollution and the economics of the region, federal funding is not provided in
proportion to Pennsylvania’s role in the problem.61 In 2010,
Pennsylvania received approximately $10.5 million in federal funding for Bay-related efforts, while Maryland received
$44.85 million and Virginia received $31.2 million.62
Investing limited funds purely on the basis of where federal
dollars might achieve the biggest bang for the buck might
well cause Pennsylvania’s share to increase substantially. Of
53. Id.
54. Chesapeake Bay Found., The Economic Argument for Cleaning up the
Chesapeake Bay and Its Rivers 5 (2012), available at http://www.cbf.org/
document.doc?id=1094.
55. See Maps, supra note 38.
56. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Managing Transboundary Aquatic Ecosystems: Lessons
From the Great Lakes, 19 Pac. McGeorge Global Bus. & Dev. L.J. 209, 221
(2006).
57. See id. (describing a prominent example of this dynamic: the Great Lakes).
58. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Sources of Nitrogen, Phosphorus and Sediment, supra note 48, at 4-2.
59. Partner Coordination & Support: Bay Funding, ChesapeakeStat, http://stat.
chesapeakebay.net/?q=node/127&quicktabs_25=2 (last visited Dec. 16, 2012).
60. For a discussion of the factors that motivate environmental federalism, see Rena
Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental Mandates and the “New (New) Federalism”:
Devolution, Revolution, or Reform, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 97, 165–75 (1996).
61. Id.
62. Id.
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course, we suspect that Pennsylvania’s own reluctance to
invest in cleanup is the reason the federal government is
provoked to lessen its contribution to the state’s programs.
In any event, until and unless Pennsylvania’s recalcitrance
is overcome, reaching TMDL targets will remain extraordinarily challenging.
Confounding these tensions is the reality that large
swaths of industrial agriculture remain unregulated under
the CWA, and Congress appears to lack the wherewithal
to plug this gaping loophole any time soon.63 Throughout
the watershed, the agricultural industry is consolidating,
with the result that animal manure and runoff are increasing as more and more animals are concentrated on small
lots.64 Over the past fifty years, the number of chickens
produced annually has increased, the poultry industry has
industrialized, and huge companies like Perdue, known as
“integrators,” have concentrated the operations that grow
their chickens around their large meat processing facilities
in a relatively small number of Southern states that include
Maryland, Delaware, and Virginia.65 The result: large-scale
operations in limited geographic areas creating too much
manure for the surrounding cropland to absorb.66 This runoff ends up washing into the local waterways that lead to
the Bay.67
Pennsylvania’s Lancaster County stands out as a glaring
example of this unfortunate trend.68 The county’s runoff,
which drains into the Susquehanna River, is a tiny fraction—1.5%—of the entire Chesapeake watershed.69 Yet,
thanks to the twenty-two million cows, pigs, chickens, and
turkeys located in Lancaster County, it manages to generate
more nitrogen from manure than any other county in the
watershed.70 The surrounding fields simply cannot absorb
the tremendous amount of manure—seventy-two million
pounds annually—that is produced.71
In the “Delmarva” region, which includes the Eastern
Shore areas of Delaware, Virginia, and Maryland, efforts by
any one state to crack down on the largest source of nutrient loading in the Bay—agriculture, including animals and
crops72 —invariably provoke threats that large employers
like Perdue will simply move their operations a little further

up the road, into the more welcoming territory of another
state jurisdiction.73
For much of the past three decades, EPA has confined
its efforts in the Bay to fielding staff experts to advise state
members of the CBP in their endless rounds of collaboration
without using its legal authority to issue and enforce binding limits on pollution that ruins water quality.74 Without
strong federal leadership, these disparities among the CBP
partners doom dialogue among the states to posturing and
recriminations, especially when the only consequence of that
behavior may be exactly what some states want: little action
and more delay.75
President Obama’s election and the appointment of Lisa
Jackson as EPA Administrator presented landmark opportunities to change these dynamics.76 In 2009, President
Obama’s Executive Order on Chesapeake Bay Protection
and Restoration required EPA to “examine how to make full
use of its authorities under the Clean Water Act to protect
and restore the Chesapeake Bay and its tributary waters.”77
EPA responded in 2011 with the “Bay Total Maximum Daily
Load” (“Bay TMDL”), which includes new limits for each
of the ninety-two “impaired water quality segments” flowing into the Bay and constitutes the nation’s first regional
TMDL.78 The Bay TMDL’s requirements are creating new
pressures on Bay jurisdictions to achieve increased reductions
from sewage treatment plants, develop stronger stormwater
controls, and develop better land use practices to control
nonpoint source pollution.79 Indeed, the apparent progress
that has been made in the past two years under the Bay
TMDL effort stands in stark contrast to the Bay Program’s
poor track record, suggesting that the Bay TMDL’s structure
of legal consequences, specific timelines, and the possibility

63. 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(e) (2012) (exempting “[a]ny introduction of pollutants
from non point-source agricultural and silvicultural activities, including storm
water runoff from orchards, cultivated crops, pastures, range lands, and forest
lands . . .”).
64. Big Chicken, supra note 34, at 1–2.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 8–13.
67. Id.
68. Chesapeake Bay Found., Waters at Risk: Pollution in the Susquehanna Watershed—Sources and Solutions 4 (2006), available at http://
www.cbf.org/document.doc?id=197 (“Lancaster County [is] the second largest producer of agricultural products east of the Mississippi, fifth in livestock
production nationally, and the largest producer of manure in the Chesapeake
Bay drainage basin.”).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Sources of Nitrogen, Phosphorus and
Sediment, supra note 48, at 4-29 (“Agriculture is the largest single source
of nitrogen, phosphorus, and sediment loading to the Bay through applying
fertilizers, tilling croplands, and applying animal manure. Agricultural activities are responsible for approximately 44 percent of nitrogen and phosphorus

74.

73.

75.
76.

77.
78.
79.

loads delivered to the Bay and about 65 percent of sediment loads delivered
to the Bay.”).
See Paul E. Gutermann & David H. Quigley, Drowning in a Sea of Clean
Water Act Regulation 3–4 (2000), available at http://www.akingump.
com/files/Publication/ecb32f29-436c-49b0-9cfa-026798edadf2/Presentation/
PublicationAttachment/34189918-0cab-496f-b712-074f8be389d4/99.pdf
(exemplifying the kind of analysis that implies that strengthening environmental controls on farmers will cause the industry to move elsewhere).
The Reasonable Assurance letter for the TMDL shows how far EPA could have
gone if it had chosen to do so. See Letter from Donald S. Welsh, Reg’l Adm’r,
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to John Griffin, Sec’y, Md. Dep’t of Natural Res.
(Sept. 11, 2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/reg3wapd/pdf/pdf_chesbay/
EPARegionIIIlettertoPSC091108.pdf.
See Howard R. Ernst, Fight for the Bay: Why a Dark Green Environmental Awakening Is Needed to Save the Chesapeake Bay 12–14 (2009).
See Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Administrator Lisa P. Jackson Testimony Before the U.S. Senate, Appropriations Subcommittee on
Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies (May
16, 2012), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/d0cf6618525a9efb85257359003fb69d/b8c60367c90d9e7d85257a00005596c2!
opendocument (requesting more funding for protecting the Chesapeake Bay);
About Administrator Lisa Jackson, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.
gov/aboutepa/administrator.html (last updated Dec. 10, 2012); see also Exec.
Order No. 13,508, 74 Fed. Reg. 23099, 23100 (May 15, 2009) (setting goals
for the federal government’s role in Chesapeake Bay restoration).
Exec. Order No. 13,508, 74 Fed. Reg. at 23101.
Clean Water Act § 303(d): Notice for the Establishment of the Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) for the Chesapeake Bay, 76 Fed. Reg. 549, 549–50
(Jan. 5, 2011).
Id.
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of rulemaking and denial of funding may create results in a
way that a “collaborative partnership” simply cannot.80

B.

Symptomatology: Institutional Design Mismatch

An understanding of the cumulative impact of the institutional problems that plague Bay restoration efforts requires
a more detailed evaluation of how the CBP partnership
evolved. The CBP is the oldest, voluntary, watershed management program in the country and has been hailed by
some “new governance” scholars as an example of how postregulatory, collaborative approaches can work.81 We do not
quarrel with the underlying imperative of holistic, watershed
management that is implied in such rosy characterizations
of the CBP.82 Rather, we are convinced that a harder look at
how the CBP works in practice reveals the stark limitations
of volunteerism that depends on high federal funding levels
and the tough, practical institutional design changes that are
now necessary if the CBP is serious about improving how it
works to restore the Bay.
The CBP is a bureaucracy created by statute,83 as well as
a creature of agreements made by its federal and state partners—an arrangement that not only dilutes the program’s
mission, but also creates confusion as to who—EPA? the
states? the CBP itself?—has final responsibility for honoring the program’s commitments to restoring the Bay.84 The
CBP got its start in 1983, after a twenty-seven million dollar study sponsored by Senator Charles “Mac” Mathias
(R-MD.) pinpointed excess nutrient pollution as the cause
of the Bay’s rapid decline and the first of three “Bay Agreements” was signed.85 Considering the four billion dollar
effort and bureaucracy that subsequently evolved, the first
Bay Agreement was modest in scope—a one-page document that created the Executive Council,86 a group that consisted of the respective state “cabinet designees” to oversee
80. See, e.g., Sustainable Growth and Preservation Act, 2012 Md. Laws 149 (enacted) (requiring new regulations for proposed septic systems). The preamble
to Act emphasizes how it is designed to respond to the Bay TMDL and support
Maryland’s efforts to meet its Phase II WIP reductions under the TMDL. Id.
81. Annecoos Wiersema, A Train Without Tracks: Rethinking the Place of Law and
Goals in Environmental and Natural Resources Law, 38 Envtl. L. 1239, 1254–
82 (2008) (citing Robert Costanza & Jack Greer, The Chesapeake Bay and Its
Watershed: A Model for Sustainable Ecosystem Management?, in Barriers and
Bridges to the Renewal of Ecosystems and Institutions 169 (Lance H.
Gunderson, C.S. Holling & Stephen S. Light eds., 1995)). But see Ernst,
supra note 75, at 10 (calling, provocatively, Bay restoration efforts a “political
deadzone”). Ernst aptly describes how the CBP was hobbled at the outset because it lacked the authority to regulate. Id. at 15. Ultimately, Ernst diagnoses
the problem as a being one of “light green environmentalism” and a lack of
political will, arguing that a “dark green” approach to Bay restoration that isn’t
afraid of conflict if necessary. Id. at 23.
82. For a positive characterization of the partnership, see Jon Cannon, Choices and
Institutions in Watershed Management, 25 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev.
379 (2000).
83. CWA § 117(b)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1267(b)(2)(B) (2006).
84. See supra notes 48–60 and accompanying discussion.
85. Chesapeake Bay Program History, Chesapeake Bay Program, http://www.
chesapeakebay.net/about/how/history (last visited Dec. 16, 2012).
86. Chesapeake Bay Program, 1983 Chesapeake Bay Agreement 1 (Dec. 9, 1983)
(unpublished agreement), available at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/content/
publications/cbp_12512.pdf [hereinafter 1983 Chesapeake Bay Agreement].
The signatories included the governors of Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania, the mayor of the District of Columbia, and the Administrator of EPA. Id.
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the coordination of Bay restoration efforts and to establish
a “liaison office for Chesapeake Bay activities.”87 Congress
subsequently incorporated this agreement into the CWA
when it created the Bay Program in 1983, defining the signatories of the Agreement as the “Executive Council” and
tasking it with “direct[ing]” the Bay Program.88 Although
the 1983 Agreement is a short document, it nevertheless
set the tone for the voluntary culture of the Bay Program
for decades to come, stating that “a cooperative approach
is needed . . . to fully address the extent, complexity, and
sources of pollutants entering the Bay” and avoiding legally
binding commitments.89
A second and more robust Bay Agreement followed in
1987.90 Significantly, it not only created far more substantive
and detailed—albeit non-binding—policy goals, including
an agreement to reduce nitrogen and phosphorus pollution
by forty percent no later than 2000, but it also changed the
membership of the Executive Council to replace the cabinet
secretaries with the governors of the signatory states (Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania) and to include both the
EPA Administrator and the chair of the Chesapeake Bay
Commission on the Council.91 In 1992, the 1987 Agreement
was amended, reaffirming the forty percent reduction goal
and expanding the CBP’s focus beyond the basin itself by
emphasizing the importance of addressing nonpoint source
pollution in the tributaries draining into the Bay.92
The third agreement—Chesapeake 2000 (“C2K”)—
continued in the same direction as the previous two
agreements, enhancing and emphasizing “the ecosystem management aspects of the Program, at least on
paper.” 93 From “set[ting] a new goal with implementation schedules for additional migratory and resident fish
passages that addresses the removal of physical blockages” to “establish[ing] harvest targets for the blue crab
fishery” to “defin[ing] the water quality conditions necessary to protect aquatic living resources,” C2K was a
87. Id.
88. CWA § 117(a)(4)–(5), 33 U.S.C. § 1267(a)(4)–(5) (defining “Chesapeake
Bay Program” to mean “the program directed by the Chesapeake Executive
Council in accordance with the Chesapeake Bay Agreement” and defining
“Chesapeake Executive Council” to mean “the signatories to the Chesapeake
Bay Agreement.”).
89. See 1983 Chesapeake Bay Agreement, supra note 86, at 1.
90. See Chesapeake Bay Program, 1987 Chesapeake Bay Agreement 1 (Dec. 15,
1987) [hereinafter 1987 Chesapeake Bay Agreement] (unpublished agreement), available at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/content/publications/
cbp_12510.pdf.
91. Id. at 3, 6. It also, as Professor Annecoos Wiersema points out, called for a
type of adaptive management, as it provided that it would “reevalu[ate]” its
forty percent nitrogen reduction target in four years, “‘based on the results of
modeling, research, monitoring and other information available at that time.’”
Wiersema, supra note 81, at 1270 (quoting 1987 Chesapeake Bay Agreement
3) (providing a good overview of the history of the CBP). Ironically, the NRC
found that “[n]either the EPA nor the Bay jurisdictions exhibit a clear understanding of adaptive management and how it might be applied in pursuit of
water quality goals.” NAS/NRC Committee Report, supra note 20, at 7; see
infra Part II.E (discussing why adaptive management should not be a substitute for an independent evaluator).
92. See Chesapeake Bay Program, Chesapeake Bay Agreement: 1992 Amendments
1 (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Chesapeake Bay Agreement: 1992 Amendments] (unpublished agreement), available at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/
content/publications/cbp_12507.pdf.
93. Wiersema, supra note 81, at 1271.
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comprehensive and ambitious document.94 The headwater states Delaware, New York, and West Virginia,95
subsequently signed a Memorandum of Understanding,
agreeing, among other things, to “[w]ork cooperatively
to achieve the nutrient and sediment reduction targets
that we agree are necessary to achieve the goals of a clean
Chesapeake Bay by 2010, thereby allowing the Chesapeake and its tidal tributaries to be removed from the list
of impaired waters.”96
All of this paperwork could look like progress, but it was
not.97 The Bay simply did not improve. Yet, this history is
important because it established the institutions that remain
active to this day. For example, the Executive Council was
established at the top of the Bay Program’s organizational
chart, where it remains, according to the CPB’s website,
“accountable to the public for progress made under the Bay
agreements.”98 Although the history reveals an increasing
awareness among the partners of the complexity of the Bay’s
ecosystem and the technical complexity of restoring it, the
CBP’s track record also reveals a disturbing trend: the members of the Executive Council—predominantly governors
who serve two terms at best—have been setting goals for
a program that will come due long after they leave office.99
This practice allows them to sidestep genuine accountability
and saddles their successors with the inevitably harsh reaction in the media and among the public when deadlines
arrive and are not met.100
Moreover, the CBP’s history reveals an increasingly complicated and growing web of voluntary interim goals that
further confuse accountability. One such agreement generated more than one hundred non-binding goals that, in
hindsight, were too broad to direct on-the-ground management and too vague to reveal who was responsible for
implementing them.101 The result was an increasingly opaque
bureaucracy with a continually revolving leadership that was
bound together only by voluntary goals and sitting on top
of so many moving parts that no one could properly be held
accountable.102 Long-time Bay Program participants agree
94. Chesapeake Bay Program, Chesapeake 2000, at 3, 6 (June 28, 2000) (unpublished agreement), available at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/content/publications/cbp_12081.pdf.
95. Id. at 12. The governors of New York and Delaware committed to Chesapeake 2000’s water quality goals through a memorandum of understanding
signed in 2000. Memorandum of Understanding Among the State of Del. et
al. 2 (2002), available at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/content/publications/
cbp_12085.pdf. The governor of West Virginia added his signature in 2002.
Id.
96. Id. at 1.
97. See, supra, notes 1–10.
98. Chesapeake Executive Council, Chesapeake Bay Program, http://www.chesapeakebay.net/groups/group/chesapeake_executive_council (last visited Dec.
16, 2012).
99. Lisa M. Ochsenhirt et al., Restoration of the Chesapeake Bay, 60 Va. Law. 45, 45
(2011) (discussing a thirteen-year program).
100. Id. at 46 (showing the repercussions from a 1987 initiative that could not be
fulfilled beginning in 2007).
101. See Steinzor & Jones, An Accountability Mechanism, supra note 40, at 5–9.
102. Partnerships, Chesapeake Bay Program, http://www.chesapeakebay.net/
about/how/partnerships (last visited Dec. 16, 2012) (“The Bay Program partnership includes: 19 federal agencies; Nearly 40 state agencies and programs
in Delaware, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia and
the District of Columbia; approximately 1,800 local governments, represented
through the Local Government Advisory Committee; More than 20 academic
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that the CBP’s “slow-moving collaborative structure” is its
greatest weakness, resulting in “‘lowest common denominator solutions’ and a lack of focus instead of increased
accountability for progress.”103
Although the Executive Council meets annually and
always takes a moment for a photo-op,104 much of the substantive decision-making and agenda-setting is delegated
to the Principals’ Staff Committee (“PSC”), which is one
“layer” down in the CBP hierarchy and one-step removed
from overt press and public scrutiny.105 The PSC primarily
consists of high-level, career environmental regulators and
resource managers representing various federal and state
agencies—the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, EPA Region
III, the Pennsylvania Department of Conservation and
Natural Resources, the Virginia Department of Agriculture
and Forestry, and the Maryland Department of the Environment—just to name a few.106 The PSC once oversaw the
CBP’s Implementation Committee, but after a recent reorganization, it now oversees the Management Board.107
The members of the PSC are clearly some of the most
capable experts in their respective policy arenas, but their
loyalties rest not with the CBP but with the state, agency,
and/or constituency they represent.108 The PSC is designed,
in large part, to ensure that each state’s concerns are represented and that the states are not pushed outside their
comfort zones.109 Despite their well-advertised and cheerfully optimistic pledges of fealty to a collaborative partnership, state government officials who participate in the CBP
must ensure in the first instance that their own state’s interests are well-guarded.110 Highly suspicious of each other’s
efforts to advertise often meager accomplishments, their
institutions, represented through the Scientific and Technical Advisory Committee; More than 60 non-governmental organizations, including businesses,
non-profits and advocacy groups”).
103. Steinzor & Jones, An Accountability Mechanism, supra note 40, at 3.
104. See, e.g., Press Release, Chesapeake Bay Program, New Course Charted for
Chesapeake Bay’s Recovery (May 12, 2009), available at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/presscenter/release/new_course_charted_for_the_chesapeake_
bays_recovery (touting the results of a meeting of the Executive Council);
Stormwater Utility Participates in Chesapeake Bay Meeting, City of Richmond
Dep’t of Pub. Utils. (2011), http://www.richmondgov.com/PublicUtilities/
documents/CheaspBayExecMeeting11July11.pdf (touting the participation of
the city of Richmond in Program activities); Kate Yanchulis, Governors Calls
for Cooperation in Chesapeake Bay Cleanup, News 21 (June 4, 2010), http://
chesapeake.news21.com/blog/index.php/2010/06/04/governors-call-forcooperation-in-chesapeake-bay-cleanup/ (touting the commitment of various
Bay state governors to the collaborative approach).
105. Principals’ Staff Committee: Scope and Purpose, Chesapeake Bay Program,
http://www.chesapeakebay.net/groups/group/principals_staff_committee (last
visited Dec. 16, 2012) (stating that the PSC “acts as the policy advisors to the
Executive Council, accepting items for Council consideration and approval,
and setting agendas for Council meetings”).
106. Id.
107. Chesapeake Bay Program, Reorganization Proposal 5 (2008), available at http://archive.chesapeakebay.net/pubs/calendar/PSC_09-22-08_
Handout_7_9784.pdf (stating that the Management Board replaced the Implementation Committee); How We’re Organized, Chesapeake Bay Program,
http://www.chesapeakebay.net/about/organized (last visited Dec. 16, 2012).
108. See Principals’ Staff Committee: Scope and Purpose, supra note 105 (“Individual
members of the PSC arrange and provide briefings to their principals, the
Agreement signatories.”).
109. See Steinzor & Jones, An Accountability Mechanism, supra note 40, at 5 (describing interviewees stating that the Program is “captured by the states”).
110. See supra notes 22–42 and accompanying text (discussing problems resulting
from conflicting interests of different states).
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strategies are defensive to the core, with each state delegation working to prevent the group from endorsing a joint
action or activity that would cast it in an negative light or
cost it too much money.111
When we interviewed long-time Bay Program participants about improving the accountability of the CBP, they
agreed that an independent mechanism was needed: “It is
very disconcerting to hear that the Program or PSC will be
deciding what should be evaluated,” one interviewee stated.112 “We need complete independence on that. . . . This
needs to be an outside group completely. It needs to be out of
the hands of the operatives.”113 “We achieve independence,”
another interviewee said, “by picking someone out of the
Program. Somebody without an agenda, who is capable of
understanding the issues and challenges, and evaluating
them in an objective way.”114
At the staff—as opposed to the political appointee—level,
the CBP is a beehive of activity that involves literally dozens
of committees, subcommittees, working groups, taskforces,
teams, and advisory groups devoted to endless discussions
of who did what to whom yesterday, the day before, and
ten years ago.115 Such an unwieldy bureaucracy not only
obfuscates restoration efforts for the general public, but it
also strains limited staff resources for the agencies and organizations that participate.116 We do not wish to imply that
this work does not accomplish some meaningful results.
Environmental conditions in the Bay are extraordinarily
well-characterized.117 Research, field testing, and the publication of an endless stream of beautiful reports demonstrate
strong understanding and analysis of the environmental
problems—from declining submerged aquatic vegetation to
decimated oyster populations—plaguing the Bay.118 But all
of this study has not translated into anything near the level
of action required to reverse the Bay’s decline.119 In our view,
the paradox between intense analysis and meager results
suggests a basic insight to all proponents of ecosystem management, adaptive management, and other “new” or “collaborative” forms of governance: describing the science is not
enough. Assessing institutional accountability needs a differ111. See supra notes 22–42 and accompanying text.
112. See Steinzor & Jones, An Accountability Mechanism, supra note 40, at 13.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Wiersema, supra note 81, at 1272 (“The Program is renowned for being complex in the sense that the relationship among committees and subcommittees
is not always a straightforward hierarchy. Even those who have devoted large
portions of their careers to the Bay Program’s work and have been involved
with it from its inception do not shy away from recognizing that the Program
is extremely complex in design and practice.”).
116. Steinzor & Jones, An Accountability Mechanism, supra note 40, at 6 (explaining how more than one interviewee from a headwater state “mentioned how
difficult it was to dedicate the staff necessary to participate fully in the various
committees and working groups”).
117. The History of Chesapeake Bay Cleanup Efforts, Chesapeake Bay Found.,
http://www.cbf.org/how-we-save-the-bay/chesapeake-clean-water-blueprint/
history-of-bay-cleanup-efforts (last visited Dec. 16, 2012) (“The Chesapeake
Bay is arguably the most studied large body of water on earth. It is an unusually complex ecosystem, but there is a great deal of scientific consensus on the
causes of its decline.”).
118. Publications: Reports, Chesapeake Bay Program, http://www.chesapeakebay.net/
publications/categories/category/report (last visited Dec. 16, 2012).
119. Steinzor & Jones, Reauthorizing the Chesapeake Bay Program, supra note 2, at 1.
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ent kind of metric, or measurement, of progress. To succeed,
oversight requires the CBP and its partners to go one crucial step further, to the point of identifying what actions are
needed to improve those conditions and which entities will
be held responsible for undertaking that work.120 Taking this
step, however, would force states to address nonpoint source
pollution—something they have been loath to do because
agricultural interests are adamantly opposed to regulation
and are politically powerful. That crucial progression will
not happen under the existing institutional structure.

II.

The Bubble Bursts: Damning Reports,
Bad Press, Reshuffling the Deck

The CBP’s bubble of collaboration—touted for years by
opportunistic politicians, anxiety-ridden bureaucrats, and
regulation-averse academics—burst in 2005 when GAO
harshly criticized the CBP’s information collection and
reporting methods.121 It found that various data had been
so “commingled” that “the public cannot easily determine
whether the health of the [B]ay is improving or not.”122
Worse, GAO concluded that the CBP deliberately perpetuated such confusion by downplaying negative trends and
painting a “rosier picture of the bay’s health” than was warranted.123 The GAO’s report so incensed Senator Barbara
Mikulski (D-MD) that she engineered the withholding of
five million dollars from the CBP until it implemented the
GAO’s recommendations for improvement.124 The amount
was relatively small, but the message that business as usual
could not continue was at last communicated.
In 2007, the CBP annual update, titled A Report to the
Citizens of the Bay Region, Chesapeake Bay Health & Restoration Assessment, dramatized both the CBP’s long-standing
hesitancy to speak plainly about the lack of progress being
made by its state partners and the pressures it was under to be
clearer.125 The report contained close to forty pages of lavish
graphics, photographs, and text.126 It acknowledged that the
Bay was in trouble, but did not explain which specific insti120. See infra note 193 (discussing metrics).
121. GAO 2005 Report, supra note 10, at 4–5. The accuracy of the Bay Program’s
numbers had been questioned by Bay advocates and reporters prior to the
GAO report. See, e.g., Peter Whoriskey, Bay Pollution Progress Overstated; Government Program’s Computer Model Proved Too Optimistic, Wash. Post, July
18, 2004, at A1 (comparing the Bay Program’s computer model with U.S.
Geological Survey water monitoring data).
122. GAO 2005 Report, supra note 10, at Highlights.
123. Id.
124. Karl Blankenship, Action Plan Will Coordinate; Review Bay Cleanup Goals,
Chesapeake Bay J., Sept. 2008, available at http://www.bayjournal.com/article/action_plan_will_coordinate_review_bay_cleanup_goals. At a congressional hearing held on July 30, 2008, GAO testified that they did not think
the Bay Program has met the objective of establishing an “independent and
objective reporting process.” U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-081033T, Chesapeake Bay Program: Recent Actions Are Positive Steps Toward More Effectively Guiding the Restoration Effort 9 (2008), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-08-1033T/pdf/
GAOREPORTS-GAO-08-1033T.pdf.
125. Chesapeake Bay Program, Chesapeake Bay 2007 Health and Restoration Assessment 6 (2007), available at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/documents/cbp_26038.pdf.
126. Id. at 1–33.
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tutions are responsible for addressing the worst problems.127
Instead, on page six, the authors tucked in the following
throw-away line: “Program scientists project that little more
than half of the pollution reduction efforts needed to achieve
the nutrient goals have been undertaken since 1985.”128 This
remarkable admission suggested what many knew: the reason the Bay’s conditions continue to worsen was that the
CBP partners had not gone nearly far enough in developing
and implementing concrete regulatory and land use management programs that would prevent discharges of nutrients
into the already polluted water.129
Two 2008 reports by the Office of Inspector General for
EPA (“IG”) subsequently bolstered GAO’s findings.130 The
IG advised EPA to tell the hard truth to Congress and the
public that the Bay Program is “significantly short of its goals”
and that partners need to make major changes if goals are to
be met.131 Then, in late 2008, The Washington Post broke a
front-page story quoting former Program officials saying they
“tried to conceal for years that their effort was failing—even
issuing reports overstating their progress—to preserve the
flow of federal and state money to the project.”132 Jeff Lape,
CBP’s director at the end of the George W. Bush Administration, removed the tagline “The Nation’s Premier Watershed Restoration Partnership” from the Program’s website,
replacing it with “A Watershed Partnership.”133 The poster
child for dialogue and volunteerism had fallen off its pedestal, and deservedly so.

A.

Reshuffling the Deck:The CBP Responds to
Criticisms

As the criticisms and dispiriting facts piled up, CBP partners—and, specifically, the PSC—responded in two crucial
ways. First, at an October 2007 PSC meeting, the Bay jurisdictions and EPA agreed that it would establish a multi-state

127. Id. at 20–31.
128. Id. at 6.
129. See, e.g., Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 08-P0049, Despite Progress, EPA Needs to Improve Oversight of Wastewater Upgrades in the Chesapeake Bay Watershed, at Introduction, 13–14
(2008) [hereinafter EPA Needs to Improve Oversight] (emphasis added),
available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2008/20080108-08-P-0049.pdf
(explaining the challenges of ensuring that wastewater treatment plants are
upgraded as required by EPA).
130. EPA Needs to Improve Oversight, supra note 129; Office of Inspector
Gen., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 08-P-0199, EPA Needs to Better
Report Chesapeake Bay Challenges 8 (2008), available at http://www.epa.
gov/oig/reports/2008/20080714-08-P-0199.pdf.
131. EPA Needs to Improve Oversight, supra note 129, at Introduction, 13–14
(emphasis added).
132. David Fahrenthold, Broken Promises on the Bay, Wash. Post (Dec. 27, 2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/26/
AR2008122601712.html. The article quotes William Matuszeski, who directed the Program for ten years, from 1991 to 2001, who “described how the
program repeatedly released data that exaggerated its success, hoping to influence Congress.” Id. The article also reports that “[h]is successor, Rebecca W.
Hanmer, said she was instructed by regional leaders in 2002 not to acknowledge that the effort would fall short of its 2010 goals.” Id.
133. Ernst, supra note 75, at 18. The tagline is now “Science, Restoration, and
Partnership.” See Chesapeake Bay Program, Chesapeake Bay Program, http://
www.chesapeakebay.net/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2012).
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TMDL.134 This decision initiated a remarkable and on-going
effort that has the potential to create, for the first time in
years, real and measurable water quality gains.135 For the first
time, restoration efforts would be measured using two-year
milestones, forcing each of the Bay jurisdictions to state, and
then achieve, short-term and specific goals.136 Second, broad
agreement was reached that the CBP needed to be reorganized in order to focus on “implementation”137 and accountability, with some calling for an independent evaluator to
improve the CBP’s credibility and ensure that on-the-ground
progress is being made.138
By the fall of 2008, the PSC had grudgingly agreed to
reorganize the Bay Program and, among other changes, create an independent evaluator.139 The authors had been working with PSC support staff to develop a framework for a truly
independent and tough auditing entity,140 and the idea was—
and continues to be—strongly supported by the Citizen
Advisory Committee (“CAC”),141 a group that provides “a
non-governmental perspective on the Bay cleanup effort.”142
But John Griffin, the secretary of the Maryland Department
of Natural Resources, who was serving a one-year term as
PSC chair, appeared to balk at the idea of setting up a new
office within the CBP structure. We suspect that resistance
to the creation of a permanent independent evaluator office
within the CBP was fueled by funding shortfalls, hypocritical concern about the creation of more “bureaucracy,” and
conflicting anxieties about whether, on one hand, the independent evaluator would be too tough on the states or, on
the other, would not be tough enough. Instead, the PSC
and, ultimately, the CBP Executive Council, was persuaded
134. Chesapeake Bay TMDL: Creating the TMDL, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
http://www.epa.gov/reg3wapd/tmdl/ChesapeakeBay/creatingthetmdl.html
(last visited Dec. 16, 2012).
135. See Oliver Houck, The Clean Water Act Returns (Again): Part I: TMDLs
and the Chesapeake Bay, 41 ELR 10208, 10216–18 (Mar. 2011) (“Fixed
requirements are often the bureaucrat’s best friend, their shield from unhappy constituencies.”).
136. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Chesapeake Bay TMDL, supra note 28, at
ES-8; see also NAS/NRC Committee Report, supra note 20, at 6 (explaining
the importance of such milestones).
137. David A. Farenthold, Bay Program Ready to Study Less, Work More, Wash.
Post (Sept. 26, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/25/AR2006092501162.html.
138. Chesapeake Bay Program, Chesapeake Bay Program Governance: Managing the Partnership for a Restored and Protected Watershed and Bay 43–44
(Feb. 27, 2009) (unpublished governance document) [hereinafter CBP
Governance], available at http://archive.chesapeakebay.net/pubs/calendar/_03-13-09_Handout_4_10155.pdf.
139. Chesapeake Bay Program, Backgrounder: Chesapeake Bay Independent Evaluation (Mar. 25, 2010) [hereinafter Backgrounder], available at http://www.
chesapeakebay.net/content/publications/cbp_51032.pdf; CBP Governance,
supra note 138, at 43. The announcement that reorganization would occur
first appeared in fall 2006. See Fahrenthold, Bay Program Ready to Study More,
supra note 137.
140. Indeed, Frank Dawson, representing the Maryland Department of Natural
Resources, presented to the PSC in September 2008 and recommended that
the “Executive Council create an Independent Evaluator within the program.”
Chesapeake Bay Program, supra note 19, at 10.
141. See Letter from Nikki L. Tinsley, Chair, Citizens Advisory Comm. to the Chesapeake Exec. Council, to Principals’ Staff Comm. (Jan. 3, 2012), available at
http://chesapeakecac.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/CAC-letter-to-PSCon-NAS-recs-Jan-2012.pdf.
142. Citizens Advisory Committee: Scope and Purpose, Chesapeake Bay Program,
http://www.chesapeakebay.net/groups/group/citizens_advisory_committee
(last visited Dec. 16, 2012).
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to support a one-time evaluation conducted by the NRC, an
option that we argued would be expensive, take three years
to complete (it did), and was likely to focus not on improving
government accountability for failed restoration but rather
on the soundness of the scientific and technical assumptions
that underlie restoration planning.143 In November 2008,
instead of creating an independent office, the Executive
Council announced that the NRC would conduct an “independent evaluation” of the CBP.144 That report was released
in May 2011.145
The CBP’s decision to ask the NRC for a one-time
report, and the manner in which the NRC chose to pursue
this work, were disappointing detours from the pursuit of
explicit, on-going institutional accountability for the CBP
partners.146 The Executive Council directed the NRC to
“evaluate and provide advice on the CBP nutrient reduction program and strategy.”147 Some meaningful aspects of
accountability are in this request—e.g., the evaluation of
how well states are “tracking” best management practice
implementation—but the committee was not asked directly
to address how independent auditors might evaluate state
programs on-the-ground.148
The NRC panel selected to lead the effort was dominated
by scientific experts who were chosen for their expertise in
such highly technical fields as “the assessment of nonpoint
source pollution on surface water quality,” “the economics of
natural resources conservation,” “ensur[ing] that the water
quality goals and water quantity needs of Florida’s agricultural industry are achieved,” “the development and application of mathematical and statistical models to . . . sediment
quality problems,” “anthropogenic alterations of biogeochemical cycles,” “the cycling of phosphorus in soil-plantwater systems,” and “modeling as a tool to predict movement
of pesticides.”149 These limitations were especially unfortunate given the CBP’s long-standing and inordinate preoccupation with the analysis of environmental conditions from
a highly technical perspective.150
The unsurprising result was that the NRC committee
made findings that in many instances sidestepped the problem of holding the partners accountable for doing more than
studying Bay environmental conditions and planning on
paper to take steps that might reduce pollution.151 For example, the NRC committee issued the following open-ended
invitation to emphasize the ongoing study of environmental
143. See generally NAS/NRC Committee Report, supra note 20, at 57–58 (summarizing the challenges that confront Bay restoration efforts and making recommendations to strengthen those efforts).
144. See CBP Governance, supra note 138 at 43–44.
145. Kim Walker, Scientists Question Bay Cleanup Tracking, B’More Green: An
Environmental Blog for Everyday Living (May 4, 2011, 11:00 AM),
http://weblogs.baltimoresun.com/features/green/2011/05/scientists_question_
bay_cleanu_1.html.
146. NAS/NRC Committee Report, supra note 20, at vii–ix.
147. Id. at viii.
148. See id. at 3.
149. These descriptions are drawn from the biographies of NRC panel members
listed in Appendix F of the NAS/NRC Committee Report. See id. at 243–45.
150. See id. at iii; see also What We Do, The Nat’l Acads., http://nationalacademies.
org/about/whatwedo/index.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2012).
151. See NAS/NRC Committee Report, supra note 20, at 163–66.
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conditions and the scientific education of the citizenry, as
opposed to the efficacy of government programs:
[s]uccess in meeting CBP goals will require careful attention
to the consequences of future population levels, development patterns, agricultural production systems, and changing climate dynamics in the Bay Watershed. . . . Helping
the public understand lag times and uncertainties associated
with water quality improvements and developing program
strategies to account for them are vital to sustaining public
support for the program, especially if near-term Bay response
does not meet expectations.152

Even so, some of the report’s findings bolster our contention that an independent evaluator should be established as
soon as possible, lest the CBP and EPA repeat their error
of failing to generate clear, relevant, and objective information in real time about what states are actually doing to
reduce the nutrient loading that is jeopardizing the Bay.153
For example, the report emphasized the problems of verifying the efficacy of so-called “best management practices”
(“BMP”) that are the vehicle for unregulated, nonpoint
sources to reduce the nutrient pollution they discharge
into the watershed.154 BMPs include such measures as
establishing riparian buffers for “trapping, filtering, and
converting sediments, nutrients, and other chemicals.”155
The NRC found that federal and state efforts to quantify
the number of functioning BMPs across the Bay jurisdictions “cannot on the whole be viewed as accurate” because
of inconsistencies, the lack of robust field verification, and
double counting.156 This problem is intensified because
current tracking systems do not include practices that are
not funded by government “cost-share” dollars.157 As a
result, the committee “was unable to determine the reliability and accuracy of the BMP data reported by the Bay
jurisdictions.”158 It was also not able to “to quantify the
magnitude or the likely direction of the error introduced
by BMP reporting issues.”159
Getting a reasonable estimate of existing BMPs is one
thing, determining the accuracy of the data reported as part
of the BMPs is quite another—and the NRC said that it
could not determine whether the BMP data reported by the
states was reliable or accurate.160 The report concludes that
“[i]ndependent (third-party) auditing of the tracking and
152. See id. at 163–64.
153. See generally Principals’ Staff Comm., Chesapeake Bay Partner’s Response to
the NRC’s Report 3 (Feb. 16, 2012) (unpublished presentation), available
at
http://www.chesapeakebay.net/channel_files/17880/(attachment_iii.a)_
recommendations_nas_report_2-16-2012_2.pptx (thanking the NRC for its
report and expressing agreement with some of its recommendations).
154. NAS/NRC Committee Report, supra note 20, at 39.
155. See Chesapeake Bay Program, No. CBP/TRS-282-06, Best Management Practices for Sediment Control and Water Clarity Enhancement 8–10 (2006), available at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/content/
publications/cbp_13369.pdf.
156. NAS/NRC Committee Report, supra note 20, at 4.
157. Id. Farmers may choose to decrease their use of expensive fertilizers regardless
of whether governments offer them subsidies to do so.
158. Id. at 83.
159. Id. at 4.
160. Id. at 4.
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accounting at state and local levels would be necessary to
ensure the reliability and accuracy of the data reported.”161
A second, scathing GAO report issued in 2011 confirmed
that the CBP was continuing business as usual to an unfortunate degree, adding urgency to continued calls for an
independent evaluator by the CAC.162 The report said that
federal and state agencies were often working at cross purposes to each other because not all private sector stakeholders are willing to acknowledge the importance, much less
the inevitability, of the federal TMDL and are instead doing
everything they can to undermine it.163 Just as disturbing,
although “[t]he watershed states are critical partners in the
effort to restore the bay, . . . state officials told GAO that they
are not working toward the [federal] goals.”164 Instead, these
state officials, who can only be described as recalcitrant,
claim they are confused as to which “strategy” or agreement
to follow, as “most state bay restoration work is conducted
according to state commitments made in a previous bay restoration agreement, the Chesapeake 2000 Agreement.”165

B.

An Independent Evaluator:The Idea Persists

Fortunately, the idea for an independent evaluator persists
in prominent documents affecting Bay restoration. President
Obama’s Executive Order 13,508 called for an “independent
evaluator [to] periodically report[] to the [Federal Leadership
Committee] on progress toward meeting the goals of this
order.”166 A box labeled “Independent Evaluator” is included
on the CBP’s organizational chart,167 and accompanying literature touts it as being “included as an organizational function in the new Bay Program structure.”168
Unfortunately, however, the opportunities for ongoing sabotage of the idea remain plentiful. Of course, as it
does with every large and small issue, the PSC appointed
a subcommittee, named the “Independent Evaluator Action
Team,” to assess its options with respect to the structure and
substance of this function.169 In November 2011, a revealing, but author-less, document entitled “Key Challenges
Identified by the Chesapeake Bay Program Partners from
the NAS/NRC Report” was distributed to the group and
made available to the public.170 The document indicates that
three camps have emerged, each arguing for disparate outcomes.171 The first would establish an “Office of the Inde161. Id.
162. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-11-802, Chesapeake Bay:
Restoration Effort Needs Common Federal and State Goals and Assessment Approach at Highlights (2011) [hereinafter GAO, Chesapeake Bay:
Restoration Effort].
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See Executive Order 13,508, 74 Fed. Reg. 23099, 23101 (May 15, 2009).
167. See How We’re Organized, supra note 107.
168. See Backgrounder, supra note 139.
169. The Executive Council created an “independent evaluator action team” tasked
with helping define the scope of the charge and inform the process. See Independent Evaluator Action Team: Scope and Purpose, Chesapeake Bay Program,
http://www.chesapeakebay.net/groups/group/independent_evaluator_action_
team (last visited Dec. 16, 2012).
170. Chesapeake Bay Program, supra note 19.
171. Id. at 12–14.
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pendent Evaluator” within the CBP that would retain “the
necessary independence to fairly and accurately evaluate the
efficiency and effectiveness of the Bay Partnership’s programs
and efforts,” and report to a “high level EPA official.”172 The
second faction, comprised of the CAC, would establish a
strong, “independent function” that would focus on whether
the CBP and its partners are “doing what we report;” it
specifically opposes the status quo, i.e., EPA acceptance of
“BMP implementation data without verification.”173 The
third and arguably most powerful camp is led by staff from
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia; it would create
“non-independent internal program evaluation,” using teams
made up of PSC members to review performance.174 Pennsylvania and Virginia assert that an independent evaluator or
evaluation of any kind is no longer necessary at all because
the PSC’s subsequent endorsement of an “adaptive management framework” takes care of the problem.175
In February 2012, the Bay Program partners officially
responded to the NRC’s report, presenting their conclusions
to the PSC.176 The PSC made several decisions to address the
NRC’s findings—from “build[ing] a partnership-wide BMP
verification system” to tasking its committees to carry out
the NRC’s adaptive management recommendations—but
deferred action on the creation of an independent evaluator.177 The PSC met again in mid-May 2012 without making
a decision on this issue.178
Although population growth and climate change in the
region have certainly made Bay restoration efforts more difficult, the critical problem with Bay restoration efforts lies
with the underlying premise of the CBP itself: that a voluntary, cooperative approach among federal and state partners
will work without genuine accountability and strong leadership. The Bay Program’s collaborative, cooperative institutional design—the very attribute for which it has long been
celebrated as a model179 —is the primary cause of the Bay
Program’s lack of progress.180 We conclude that as long as the
Bay Program lacks real authority to require its federal and
state partners to take action, no entity is directly responsible
for Bay cleanup—and no entity takes the blame for the man172. Id. at 12.
173. Id. at 14.
174. Id. at 13.
175. Id. at 14.
176. Principals’ Staff Comm., Chesapeake Bay Partners’ Response, supra note 153.
177. Minutes from Chesapeake Bay Program Principals’ Staff Comm. Meeting, supra note 22.
178. Chesapeake Bay Program, Chesapeake Bay Program Update: Management
Board Meeting 6 (May 9, 2012) (unpublished meeting agenda), available
at
http://www.chesapeakebay.net/channel_files/18082/(attachment_i.b)_
program_update.pdf.
179. See, e.g., Robert W. Adler et al., Lessons From Large Watershed Programs 83 (2000) (exploring the challenges that confront large-scale, multijurisdictional programs to restore water quality in sprawling watersheds); Jon
Cannon, Checking in on the Chesapeake: Some Questions of Design, 40 U. Rich.
L. Rev. 1131, 1131 (2006) [hereinafter Checking in on the Chesapeake] (considering potential changes to the Bay program’s institutional design); Mark
Imperial et al., An Evolutionary Perspective on the Development and Assessment of
the National Estuary Program, 20 Coastal Mgmt. 311, 324 (1992) (concluding the CBP’s success makes it a model for other watershed collaborations).
180. See Checking in on the Chesapeake, supra note 179 (offering a different perspective). Jon Cannon concludes that, despite its failures, restructuring the Bay
Program is not in order. Id. at 1131.
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ifest failure. Accordingly, the Bay Program must shift away
from the current supportive environment that avoids targeting responsibility—without sacrificing the cooperation that
is essential to its success and survival—and overhaul how the
Program holds itself and its state partners accountable.

III. The Independent Evaluator: Mission,
Characteristics, and Resistance
A.

Mission

With a restoration price tag in the billions of dollars, a bad
economy that has yet to emerge from an unprecedented global
tailspin, and strong public aversion to higher taxes and the
government programs they support, the idea of creating yet
another group of bureaucrats to monitor progress in restoring the Chesapeake Bay may seem like a fool’s errand.181 Our
critique of the alphabet soup of committees, subcommittees,
working groups, and taskforces should have convinced us,
the reader may well be thinking, that checking on the checkers is unlikely to overcome the powerful forces invested in
business as usual—in this case, the full employment for hundreds of career bureaucrats who are deeply entrenched in the
status quo of taking one step forward and two steps back.
We persist for one simple reason: the only administrative methodology that remains rare in the Chesapeake Bay
watershed is a prominent, well-respected, objective entity
willing to expose grand plans that are not working.182 In
the exceptional cases when such voices have emerged—most
notably, when GAO issued the withering 2005 report that
created the conditions that compelled EPA to promulgate
the Bay TMDL—they have proved remarkably effective.183
The existing program’s stalwart embrace of complexity, to
the point that unraveling what is really happening on the
ground is virtually impossible, is the best reason why the
institutional equivalent of the boy who told the emperor he
had no clothes is essential.184 Nationally respected auditors
such as GAO and the NRC can help periodically with the
evaluation of the intrinsically inconsistent paper promises
made by federal and state officials or the scientific and technical challenges that stymy them.185 Only an organization
embedded in the daily operations of restoration, however,
will be able to dig deep enough to consistently establish
accountability. The independent evaluator’s mission must
be to promote accountability by continually diagnosing the
specific problems that prevent the CBP and its partners from
achieving Bay restoration goals and then allocating responsibility for why these problems are not being addressed. Put
181. Jeff Hager, Effort to Save Chesapeake Bay Carries Costs, ABC2 News (July
10, 2012), http://www.abc2news.com/dpp/news/region/baltimore_county/
effort-to-save-chesapeake-bay-carries-costs (presenting a farmer’s view of increased regulations).
182. See, e.g., GAO, Recent Actions, supra note 4, at 9 (discussing the 2005 GAO
report which indicated numerous problems with the management of the restoration progress).
183. See id.
184. See supra pp. 58–60.
185. See GAO, Chesapeake Bay: Restoration Effort, supra note 162, at Highlights; NAS/NRC Committee Report, supra note 20, at 49.
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more directly, the independent evaluator’s mission is institutional accountability, namely, assessing whether promised or
required federal and state actions are in fact happening and,
if not, why not.

B.

Characteristics

The independent evaluator should have three essential,
closely related characteristics: (1) independence and neutrality; (2) work guided by a short list of evolving metrics; and
(3) a problem-solving orientation. The actual and, as important, perceived authority to set its own agenda without interference by EPA or the Bay states is the irreducible quid pro
quo for this approach to succeed. The independent evaluator
should be a free-standing entity, run by a relatively senior
person with impeccable reputation, who reports directly to
the Chesapeake Bay Program Executive Council.186 At all
stages of its development, the independent evaluator should
remain independent of existing chains of command, especially the PSC, the group of senior federal and state officials
who advise the CBP Executive Council and who are heavily
invested in the status quo.187
To structure its work, the independent evaluator should
develop a discrete set of no more than two dozen metrics that
measure the most important aspects of federal and state performance in implementing the Bay TMDL.188 For example:
• For each sector, is the state’s NPDES permitting program effective at issuing up-to-date permits for all
facilities that require them? Specifically, what percentage of NPDES permits are up-to-date?
• When will the state have all permits updated and
rewritten to include the Bay-wide TMDL and individual tributary segment TMDLs?
• What are the total number of violations, the number
of civil and administrative penalty actions, and the
amount of civil and administrative penalties collected
in the relevant watersheds during the last year?189
186. Chesapeake Executive Council: Scope and Purpose, Chesapeake Bay Program,
http://www.chesapeakebay.net/groups/group/chesapeake_executive_council
(last visited Dec. 16, 2012) (“The Chesapeake Executive Council was established by the Chesapeake Bay Agreement of 1983. Under the 1987 Chesapeake
Bay Agreement, membership changed from cabinet secretaries to the governors
of Maryland, Pennsylvania and Virginia; the administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; the mayor of the District of Columbia; and the
chair of the Chesapeake Bay Commission, a legislative body serving Maryland,
Pennsylvania, and Virginia.”).
187. Principals’ Staff Committee: Scope and Purpose, supra note 105 (“The Principals’
Staff Committee (PSC) acts as the policy advisors to the Executive Council,
accepting items for Council consideration and approval, and setting agendas
for Council meetings. Individual members of the PSC arrange and provide
briefings to their principals, the Agreement signatories. The PSC also provides
policy and program direction to the Implementation Committee.”).
188. See generally Rena Steinzor & Sidney Shapiro, The People’s Agents and
the Battle to Protect the American Public: Special Interests, Government, and Threats to Health, Safety, and the Environment 173–91
(2010) (discussing why indicators, or metrics, are important to government
accountability).
189. See William L. Andreen et al., Ctr. for Progressive Reform, Ensuring
Accountability in Chesapeake Bay Restoration: Metrics for the Phase
I Watershed Implementation Plans 3–9 (2010), available at http://www.
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Because EPA has threatened serious consequences for
states that do not meet their interim “milestones,” the states
routinely claim in their Watershed Implementation Plans
(“WIP”) that they are on schedule to meet TMDL targets.190
Those plans do not disclose, however, how fast the states
will rewrite permits to reduce point source discharges down
to acceptable levels, making it very difficult to judge those
claims.191 Metrics such as the above would reveal whether or
not the states are on schedule to meet their TMDL targets.
Last but not least, the independent evaluator’s reports
on federal and state government compliance with the
TMDL should include potential solutions to address
shortfalls in the states’ performance. If funding is inadequate to achieve the relevant goals, the reports should say
how much is needed and how it might be raised. If the
poor performance of state agencies or regulated industries’
recalcitrance is a problem, the reports should acknowledge
those unpleasant realities.

1.

Neutrality and Independence

As we have noted, state government officials who participate
in the CBP first must ensure that their own state’s interests
are protected. The results are strategies that are defensive
rather than proactive, ultimately driven by the concern that
the CBP might endorse actions that would cast the state in
a negative light or cost too much.192 Not surprisingly, the
chair of the Chesapeake Bay Commission, who sits on the
CBP Executive Council, rotates,193 and the CBP Executive
Council elects its Chair from a different state or agency every
few years, lest any particular state be able to use the position to impose its own policy initiatives.194 Yet for all these
precautions, the Council is primarily a ceremonial body.195
The real work of opposing disadvantageous initiatives and
progressivereform.org/articles/CPR_Chesapeake_Metrics.pdf (providing more
examples of possible metrics).
190. E.g., Md. Dept. of the Env’t. et al., Maryland’s Phase II Watershed Implementation Plan for the Chesapeake Bay TMDL 11 (2012), available
at http://www.mde.state.md.us/programs/Water/TMDL/TMDLImplementation/Documents/FINAL_PhaseII_Report_Docs/Final_Documents_PhaseII/
Final_Phase_II_WIP_MAIN_REPORT_102612.pdf (stating that it “is projected” that the state will meet EPA’s expectations for 2017); see Chesapeake Bay
TMDL: How Does it Work? Ensuring Results, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://
www.epa.gov/reg3wapd/tmdl/ChesapeakeBay/EnsuringResults.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2012) (providing links to each of the First Phase WIPs submitted
by the states to EPA in December 2010).
191. E.g., Md. Dept. of the Env’t, supra note 190, at 10, 14–15, 76–77, 81 (stating plans for reductions from point sources for 2017 without stating how fast
they will rewrite permits for point sources to achieve reductions).
192. See id.
193. Chesapeake Executive Council: Scope and Purpose, supra note 186; What Is the
Chesapeake Bay Commission?, Chesapeake Bay Program (Jan. 28, 2011), http://
www.chesapeakebay.net/blog/post/what_is_the_chesapeake_bay_commission.
194. Press Release, Chesapeake Bay Program, Chesapeake Executive Council Elects
New Chair, Announces Local Government Award Recipients and Discusses
Progress Toward Healthy Waters (July 9, 2012), available at http://www.
chesapeakebay.net/presscenter/release/chesapeake_executive_council_elects_
new_chair_announces_local_government_aw; Press Release, Chesapeake Bay
Program, EPA Administrator Lisa P. Jackson Becomes Chair of Chesapeake
Executive Council (Jan. 5, 2010), available at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/
presscenter/release/epa_administrator_lisa_p._jackson_becomes_chair_of_
chesapeake_executive_cou.
195. See infra notes 55–65 and accompanying text.
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poking holes in rival states’ claims of glory is done within
the PSC.196
In approaching this difficult playing field with such
unabashed cynicism, we hasten to acknowledge that the
CBP’s efforts have advanced the cause of Bay restoration,
although not nearly as quickly or effectively as the Bay partners themselves promised.197 As we said at the outset, the
Chesapeake Bay’s environmental conditions are exceptionally well understood.198 It may be that Federal money for
such research on that subject was consumed rapidly by the
CBP because it was a far more acceptable way to channel the
work of its committees and subcommittees than the formulation of more stringent pollution controls. Now that EPA is
making its best efforts to force the PSC off this safe island of
relatively benign investigative activity and into the arena of
making hard and expensive choices, the time is ripe for the
introduction of an auditor capable of making credible pronouncements that progress has—or, even more important,
has not—been made.199
The individual who heads the office of the independent evaluator, as well as the professional staff he or she
leads, must not only be capable of behaving with dispassion, but also be perceived as dispassionate in judging
the performance of the Bay states and EPA. He or she
must not owe—nor be perceived as owing—any loyalty
to the private sector constituencies that have infiltrated
the CBP’s extensive bureaucratic infrastructure—from
sewage treatment plant operators, to farmers, to environmental groups.200 Finding people with these characteristics is far easier said than done, and could prove almost
impossible if expertise is considered the most important
criterion in recruitment.
In the context of the Chesapeake Bay and the disappointing history of efforts to restore it,201 appointing an
independent evaluator with Bay-specific expertise could
undermine actual and perceived neutrality. Virtually anyone who can claim an extensive scientific, technical, legal,
or administrative background in the work of the CBP
may be perceived by other participants as having an axe
to grind. Even reputable scholars at local academic institutions are not immune from these suspicions, in no small
measure because they depend on the CBP’s largesse for
grant funding, and therefore have a vested stake in sing196. See infra notes 55–65 and accompanying text.
197. U.S. Geological Survey, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, FS–125–01,The U.S.
Geological Survey Chesapeake Bay Science Program 2 (2001), available
at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs125-01/fs125-01.pdf.
198. See, e.g., Chesapeake Bay Program, 2004 Chesapeake Bay Oyster Management Plan (2005) (recognizing ecological impacts resulting in reduced historic oyster populations and the need to restore the oyster population), available at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/content/publications/cbp_12889.pdf;
see also J. Court Stevenson, Catherine B. Piper & Nedra Confer, U.S.
Fish & Wildlife Serv., Decline of Submerged Plants in Chesapeake Bay
(1979), available at http://www.fws.gov/chesapeakebay/savpage.htm (highlighting the decline in Bay-wide aquatic grass beds).
199. See Letter from Shawn M. Garvin, Reg’l Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to
Principals’ Staff Comm. Members (Jun. 11, 2010), available at http://www.
epa.gov/reg3wapd/pdf/pdf_chesbay/TMDLScheduleLetter.pdf.
200. GAO, Recent Actions, supra note 4, at 13 (highlighting the CBP’s lack of
independent and creditable mechanisms).
201. Id.
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ing its praises.202 Precisely because such an unusually large,
diverse, and entrenched professional class of experts is in
existence and has ossified into familiar patterns of deflecting problems and justifying inactivity, choosing an independent evaluator principal or staff from that cadre could
easily undermine the office from the start.
Instead, the priority should be to hire people with investigative expertise. Predicting the water quality impact of
applying chicken manure to frozen ground may be important to Bay restoration, as is analyzing the efficacy of certain cover crops in trapping nutrients before they wash into
tributaries,203 but such experts are already active in the
CBP.204 The value added by an independent evaluator is
the ability to check whether winter application is in fact
happening or whether cover crops have actually gone into
the ground.205
The ideal candidate for independent evaluator would
be a senior law enforcement official with experience under
fire, or rather, who has policed a contentious and complex
industry or geographical area. We suggest this profile not
because we are recommending that the independent evaluator be granted enforcement powers by Congress. Rather,
we think that the prosecution of civil and criminal violators should continue to reside with federal and state regulators. Nevertheless, investigative experience would equip the
independent evaluator to navigate the complicated operations of the CBP, searching for indicators of whether restoration is going well or poorly.
The independent evaluator should have sufficient
resources to hire a staff of similarly qualified investigators,
including experts in crucial support specialties such as data
analysis and computing. Because much of the office’s work
will involve field inspections throughout the watershed, the
staff should be skilled in conducting witness interviews and
recovering documents.
Because the independent evaluator will be a new entity
operating without federal or state statutory authority, the
office could encounter serious problems if owners and
operators of facilities that contribute pollution to the Bay
resist its investigative efforts. One solution to this problem
would be for EPA and Bay state governors to condition
the receipt of federal and state funding on cooperation
with those investigations. A second approach would be for
the independent evaluator to request assistance in cases
involving recalcitrant targets from the relevant federal
and state regulatory agencies. Should Congress recover
from its existing state of gridlock and prepare to consider
overdue legislation to reauthorize the CBP, the independent evaluator should be given all of the powers to inves202. Grants & RFPs, Chesapeake Bay Program, http://www.chesapeakebay.net/
rfps (last visited Dec. 16, 2012) (listing grant opportunities from the CBP).
203. See Chesapeake Bay Program, Chesapeake Bay Program Strategic Implementation Plan: Restoring Healthy Waters 1–5 (July 24, 2007) (unpublished draft
report), available at http://archive.chesapeakebay.net/pubs/calendar/TSC_0912-07_Handout_9_7940.pdf.
204. Id.
205. See infra pp. 59–60 (discussing the importance of on-the-ground investigation
and fact checking).
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tigate that it needs, including the authority to issue access
orders and subpoenas.206
The office should report directly to the CBP Executive
Council, which should retain exclusive authority to hire or
fire its director, as opposed to delegating the function to the
PSC. The one drawback of the Executive Council is that it
does not include all the Bay states, omitting new members
New York, Delaware, and West Virginia.207 It is by far the
best choice, however, for political and practical reasons.
Conferring this supervisory authority on EPA would inspire
needless and draining opposition by recalcitrant states, while
handing it to the PSC would ensure that the independent
evaluator’s status is reduced to the level of that body’s other
committees, taskforces, and working groups. A neutral broker is needed.

2.

Metrics

At the threshold, the independent evaluator will only succeed by establishing criteria—or, more accurately, “metrics”—for judging federal and state advancement toward the
overall goal of restoring the Bay. CBP has made enormous
progress in defining and measuring progress in the context
of ambient environmental conditions in the Bay and has
established numerical goals for reducing various types of
pollution within a set period of time. But creating accountability needs a different kind of metric, or measurement, of
progress. To succeed, any oversight must go one crucial step
beyond defining environmental conditions to the point of
identifying what actions are needed to improve those conditions and which entities will be held responsible for undertaking that work.
At the same time, because sorting through the volume
of information generated and disseminated on a daily basis
is, for most of us, a never-ending task, the metrics must be
pointed and concise if they are going to effectively resonate
with policymakers and the public. Professor Wendy Wagner
has coined the phrase “filter failure” to describe the problem of information overload that is pervasive in regulatory
affairs.208 She explains that the cramming of rulemaking
records by private sector contractors leads in turn to “information capture.” 209 This phenomenon dramatically strengthens the influence of special interest groups who can afford to
generate endless, redundant, and marginally relevant reams
of data—leaving civil servants, public interest groups, and
the public itself in the proverbial dust when decisions must
206. See Chesapeake Bay Found., Chesapeake Clean Water Act Blocked in U.S. Senate, Bay Daily (Dec. 21, 2010, 5:10 PM), http://cbf.typepad.com/bay_daily/2010/12/senate-majority-leader-harry-reid-has-abandoned-plans-to-bringto-the-floor-an-omnibus-bill-designed-to-protect-wilderness-ar.html (describing the challenges such legislation would face).
207. See Chesapeake Executive Council: Scope and Purpose, supra note 186 (listing
only the governors of Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia and the District of
Columbia, the Administrator of EPA, and the chair of Chesapeake Bay Commission as Executive Council members).
208. Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture,
59 Duke L.J. 1321, 1328 (2010).
209. “In the regulatory context, information capture refers to the excessive use of
information and related information costs as a means of gaining control over
regulatory decisionmaking in informal rulemakings.” Id. at 1325.
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be made.210 Wagner says that the “root cause” of information capture “is not administrative law’s commitment to
open government and transparency, but rather its failure to
require participants to self-process the information they load
into the system.”211
Filter failure and information capture run rampant in the
CBP. The major culprits are not private sector special interest
groups hoping to derail or delay rulemaking, but rather federal and state government employees who write voluminous
documents describing every initiative they design to make
progress on Bay restoration.212 The CBP is quite proud of its
ChesapeakeStat website, launched in 2010 “to increase government accountability and improve coordination of restoration actions by providing information on partner activities,
funding, and progress towards goals.”213 The site contains a
wealth of information regarding conditions in the Bay—e.g.,
the percentage of land covered by impervious surfaces such
as parking lots that produce polluted run-off—and even
allows readers to make their own maps by overlaying data
about those conditions on top of one another.214 It does not,
however present any form of auditing information about an
individual state’s actual performance in permitting, inspecting, or enforcing the law with respect to individual sources,
whether regulated or not.215 To mangle a popular adage,
nitrogen does not pollute the Bay; parking lots in Maryland,
concentrated animal feeding operations in Virginia, and
sewage treatment plants in Pennsylvania do.216
As for EPA’s efforts to track state progress in implementing the TMDL, the Agency appears allergic to creating templates, inventing standardized forms, or in any other way
asking the states to provide information that can be compared easily by anyone other than the experts themselves.217
This omission, which also wastes EPA’s resources, is especially egregious with respect to important documents, such
as WIPs, which supposedly explain, in a way cognizable by
210. “To make matters worse, as the issues grow more numerous and technical,
less well-financed interest groups find it hard to continue participating in the
process. They often lack the time, the resources, or the expertise to continue
reviewing all of the information that becomes part of the rulemaking record.
Yet as their engagement wanes, so does the pluralistic engine considered so fundamental to the administrative process. They can no longer provide a means
of culling out extraneous information and other chaff from the rulemaking
through their vigorous engagement. Incentives to load as much information as
possible into the system, combined with a reduction in the number and diversity of affected parties participating in the rulemaking process, set the stage for
information capture.” Id. (citations omitted).
211. Id.
212. See Wiersema, supra note 81, at 1277–80; Steinzor & Jones, An Accountability
Mechanism, supra note 40, at 6.
213. About ChesapeakeStat, ChesapeakeStat, http://stat.chesapeakebay.net/?q=
node/5 (last visited Dec. 16, 2012).
214. See Water Quality: Agriculture, ChesapeakeStat, http://stat.chesapeakebay.net/?
q=node/130&quicktabs_10=1&quicktabs_15=7 (last visited Dec. 16, 2012).
215. See id.
216. Cf. James Bacon, Fast Draw Clubs Grow, The Hutchinson News, May 31,
1959, at 6 (“Guns don’t kill people. People kill people.”).
217. See TMDL Implementation and Tracking, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://
water.epa.gov/lawsregs/lawsguidance/cwa/tmdl/implement.cfm (last updated
Mar. 6, 2012) (“Because there are often numerous control practices involved in
a single TMDL’s implementation, it would be particularly complex and expensive for states or EPA to track all implementation actions under all TMDLs.
Moreover, whereas EPA oversees and approves TMDL development by states,
the Agency does not have authority over their implementation.”).

65

citizens, what the states will do to meet new TMDL pollution limits.218 In a report card focusing on the first round
of WIPs, the Center for Progressive Reform recommended
changes in the required disclosures for WIPs so that the
states’ progress in meeting TMDLs could be verified.219
Those recommendations have yet to bear fruit.
These deeply engrained and exceptionally bad habits
underscore the need for an independent evaluator to structure its work by adopting a small but meaningful set of indicators—or accountability metrics—that are digestible by
public interest groups, the public at large, and the media.
The focus of these metrics should be institutional progress
toward the overall goal of restoring the Bay, as opposed to
data that describes environmental conditions in the Bay.
So, rather than reporting the blue crab population throughout the Bay, accountability metrics would disclose whether
(1) all concentrated animal feeding operations have updated
permits; (2) such facilities were inspected by a state official;
(3) violations were found; and (4) the state took steps to compel the facility to correct these problems. In other words,
accountability metrics should focus on the actual implementation of state plans in an effort to measure the extent to
which the CBP and its partners’ efforts result in improved
environmental quality.
The design of an accountability metrics program should
be informed by the following five criteria:
• Short and Concise. Elaborate metrics involving multiple vague, qualitative measures have limited utility.
• Worst, First. Metrics should be prioritized to allow the
Program and its partners to focus on the most important problems.
• Information Forcing. Metrics should not depend—or
be circumscribed by—the availability of information
needed to determine if they are met. If metrics were
designed based only on whether information is available, they would not provide federal and state partners
with any incentive to produce new information that
might be important to Bay restoration.
• Continuous Evolution. Metrics should be changed
as often as possible to reflect progress and spur further
advances.

218. Compare Commonwealth of Va., Chesapeake Bay TMDL Phase II Watershed Implementation Plan (2012), available at http://www.dcr.virginia.gov/
vabaytmdl/documents/baytmdlp2wip.pdf (explaining how Virginia intends to
comply with the numerical limits established by the Baywide TMDL), with Md.
Dept. of the Env’t et al., Maryland’s Phase II Watershed Implementation Plan for the Chesapeake Bay TMDL (2012) available at http://www.
mde.state.md.us/programs/Water/TMDL/TMDLImplementation/Pages/FINAL_PhaseII_WIPDocument_Main.aspx (explaining how Maryland plans to
comply with the numerical limits established by the Baywide TMDL), and Pa.
Dept. of Envtl. Prot., Pennsylvania Chesapeake Watershed Implementation Plan Phase 2 (2012) (explaining how Pennsylvania intends to comply
with the numerical limits established by the Baywide TMDL), available at http://
www.epa.gov/reg3wapd/pdf/pdf_chesbay/PhaseIIWIPS/PAFINALPhase2
WIP3-30-2012.pdf.
219. See generally Andreen et al., supra note 189, at 11–14 (proposing reforms of
the CWA to make it more effective in protecting the environment).
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• Diagnostic. Metrics should have the potential to help
diagnose the causes of institutional and regulatory
dysfunction—including funding gaps, technical complexity, failures of political will, inadequate statutory
design, and agency capture.220

3.

Solutions

Beyond developing core metrics and updating them to keep
pace with new developments, the independent evaluator’s
most important function will be to verify federal and state
planning documents by conducting spot-check inspections
of what government officials have actually accomplished.
Ideally, these progress reports will not simply issue a failing or a passing grade, but will suggest solutions.221 This
approach is especially important when control over remedying the poor or non-existent performance is vested in
another branch of government.
For example, states have labored under severe economic
constraints since the 2008 market crash that caused the
ongoing recession, and governors have either cut or failed
to increase the budgets for state environmental agencies.222
To leverage the negative political implications of neglecting
the Chesapeake Bay—especially in places like Maryland
and Virginia where its ongoing environmental vitality is of
crucial importance to the local economy—the independent
evaluator’s conclusion that budget shortfalls are causing the
states to fall behind in meeting their TMDL targets could
prove quite helpful.223 Useful suggestions on revenue-raising
measures could help not only to get the governor’s attention,
but also to recruit additional allies in the state legislature.224

C.

Arguments Against

Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia oppose creating an independent evaluator based on the assumption that
adaptive management will fulfill the same purpose, allowing
the Program to accomplish several program evaluations.225
Perhaps more to the point, “[w]ith reductions in federal and
state funds, it is imperative that federal funds be directed
to assisting the jurisdictions in meeting the required TMDL
reductions and not be diverted to programs which do not
have a direct effect on ground water quality improvement.”226
Adaptive management is a much-discussed and popular con220. See generally GAO, Recent Actions, supra note 4, at 13 (exposing some of
these issues in the current CBP structure).
221. See generally Andreen et al., supra note 189, at 11–14 (issuing grades and
suggestions).
222. See, e.g., Dep’t of Budget & Mgmt., Maryland Budget Highlights: FY
2011, at 44–45 (2011), available at http://www.dbm.maryland.gov/agencies/
operbudget/Documents/2011/FY2011BudgetHighlights.pdf (disclosing the
Governor’s allocations for state agencies).
223. See Chesapeake Bay Program, supra note 19, at 7–14 (offering recommendations to improve adaptive management and identifying budget issues).
224. Valiant Corley, County’s Crisis Letter Gets Governor’s Attention, Curry Coastal
Pilot (Mar. 16, 2012, 9:49 PM), http://www.currypilot.com/News/LocalNews/Countys-crisis-letter-gets-governors-attention (discussing how a citizen
group proposed revenue raising options to forestall cutting services, thereby
gaining the governor’s attention).
225. See Chesapeake Bay Program, supra note 19, at 13–14.
226. Id. at 14.

Winter 2013

cept in environmental law and public administration.227 The
term refers to the idea that programs designed to preserve
natural resources should be designed with enough flexibility
to respond to changes in the natural world.228 As one group
of natural resource scholars has described it:
The concept of adaptive natural resource management was
developed in the 1970s by ecologist C.S. “Buzz” Holling and
fisheries biologist Carl Walters. They argued that limited
knowledge about natural systems called for a structured,
iterative approach to environmental management. The
goal of this approach was to reduce uncertainty over time
by systematically incorporating learning into management.
They called for managers to design their actions as scientific
experiments, monitoring the outcomes, and adjust management direction in light of what the experiments revealed.229

Adaptive management programs must include:
[E]xplicitly stated goals and measureable indicators of progress toward those goals; an iterative approach to decisionmaking, providing the opportunity to adjust decisions in
light of subsequent learning; systematic monitoring of outcomes and impacts; feedback loops so that monitoring and
assessment produce continuous and systematic learning that
in turn is incorporated into subsequent rounds of decisionmaking; explicit acknowledgment and characterization of
risks and uncertainties . . . ; [and] an overarching goal to
reduce uncertainty over time.230

Of course, nothing on the face of generally accepted
concepts of adaptive management conflicts with the institutional design of the independent evaluator we have proposed. In fact, the independent evaluator could provide
significant benefits to adaptive management, especially
given the strong possibility that, without constant pressure,
the Bay states will fall back into their old patterns of much
talk and little action.
The demand to conduct independent evaluation has very
little to do with the hope that at some future point, adaptive
management will work well in the region. Adaptive management in the Chesapeake Bay may be a goal that some
CBP participants have embraced in the expectation that it
will allow them to make necessary pollution reductions in
a “flexible” manner, which could mean more responsive and
cost-effective reactions to environmental needs, or it could
mean less timely and less expensive reactions.231 But this
approach is far from being implemented.
The NRC committee reported that “although many of
the CBP partners think they are implementing adaptive
management,” in fact there was no evidence that “any for227. Holly Doremus et al., Making Good Use of Adaptive Management 1 (Ctr. for
Progressive Reform, White Paper No. 1104, Apr. 2011), available at http://
www.progressivereform.org/articles/Adaptive_Management_1104.pdf.
228. Id. at 2.
229. Id.
230. Id.; see also Rena Steinzor et al., Getting Serious About Saving the Chesapeake
Bay, 25 The Abell Rep., No. 1, 2012, at 1–2 (“After decades of broken promises, the EPA and the other Bay states now say they’re serious about cleaning
up the Bay. The key will be holding them accountable.”).
231. See Chesapeake Bay Program, supra note 19, at 13–14.

Copyright © 2013 Environmental Law Institute® and The George Washington University Law School, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission.

Winter 2013

COLLABORATING TO NOWHERE

mal adaptive management efforts for nutrient and sediment reduction” are in place.232 The committee also noted
that although “some WIPs refer to uncertainties about
funding, effectiveness of specific management practices,
incompatible datasets, future land-use changes, and the
quality of the EPA’s models,” the states do not explain
“whether, or how,” they would deal with these uncertainties through adaptive management.233
However mistaken the three states’ resistance to the creation of an independent evaluator may seem on the merits,
the political dynamics in the region are sufficiently troubled
that the idea is unlikely to be implemented unless EPA, other
states, and citizen and environmental advocates put considerable pressure on the CBP to act.234
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At the same time that EPA has stepped forward to lead the
Bay restoration effort, moving the states back into a system of regulatory compulsion,235 the nation is experienc-

ing a well-financed campaign to provoke an overwhelming
backlash against such requirements.236 The danger is that
non-specific claims about the evils of regulation will give
recalcitrant state governments and potentially regulated
industries the excuses they need to relapse into cooperative inaction, leaving the Chesapeake Bay and the nation’s
other great waters to degenerate slowly but irrevocably into
ecological ruin. This outcome would be particularly tragic
because the severe transboundary pollution problems that
plague the Bay will never be solved if state governments are
left to their own devices.237
Transitioning from collaboration that primarily benefits
environmental professionals to a system where governments
are held accountable for inaction seems almost impossible in
this polarized environment.238 The alternative, however, is
even more unthinkable. Compared to the billions spent on
restoration in the past three decades, the independent evaluator is a modest proposal, easy to set up and administer. All it
will take is the determination to truly reform the CBP’s preference for cooperation that asks little and delivers even less.239

232. NAS/NRC Committee Report, supra note 20, at 108.
233. Id. at 110.
234. See generally Steinzor et al., Getting Serious, supra note 230, at 3–4 (stating that
states have the ability to adopt more stringent standards and programs to help
the Bay, but “political considerations in each state make that unlikely”).
235. Chesapeake Bay TMDL: Creating the TMDL, supra note 134.

236. Elana Schor & Sarah Abruzzese, Tea Party’s Congressional Allies Diverge on
How to Gut EPA, N.Y. Times (Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
gwire/2011/02/10/10greenwire-tea-partys-congressional-allies-diverge-onhow-6387.html.
237. See generally Andreen et al., supra note 189, at 11–14 (giving current efforts
a failing grade).
238. Schor & Abruzzese, supra note 236 (“[T]ea party leaders are still working to
align their ambitious rhetoric with direct actions to rein in U.S. EPA.”).
239. See generally Andreen et al., supra note 189, at 11–14 (evaluating the quality
of the first phase of state watershed implementation plans).

IV.

Conclusion

